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Abstract 
We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy reduce corporate risk-taking. 
Employing country-level data, we find that strong creditor rights are associated with a 
greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying mergers, and this propensity changes 
in response to changes in the country creditor rights. Also, in countries with stronger 
creditor rights companies’ operating risk is lower, and acquirers with low-recovery assets 
prefer targets with high-recovery assets. These relationships are strongest in countries 
where management is dismissed in reorganization, suggesting an agency-cost effect.    
Our results suggest that there might be a “dark” side to strong creditor rights in that they 
can induce costly risk avoidance in corporate policies. Thus, stronger creditor rights may 
not necessarily be optimal.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Stronger creditor rights are generally considered a good thing.  They may expand 
the financing capacity of the firm by limiting the ability of owners to expropriate firm’s 
value, thus reducing the costs that result from the conflict of interests between owners 
and providers of debt capital.1   This paper proposes that strong creditor rights may also 
have a “dark side” in that they affect the corporate investment policy: stronger creditor 
rights induce firms to engage in risk-reducing, potentially inefficient, investments.  
Strong creditor rights in default may also cause inefficient liquidations that extinguish the 
continuation option of firm’s enterprise and impose private costs on managers if these 
rights mandate the replacement of management. To avoid these costs, shareholders and 
management reduce the likelihood of distress by cutting down on risk-taking activities, 
for example, by diversifying or reducing operating risk, actions that that would otherwise 
not be undertaken. We provide cross-country as well as within-country empirical 
evidence in support of this thesis. 
Our empirical evidence employs three different measures of corporate risk-taking 
whose variation across countries we seek to explain.  We find the following:  
 
(1) Creditor rights affect the nature of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity – 
whether it is focusing or diversifying across industries. Stronger creditor rights 
in a country are associated with a greater propensity to do diversifying mergers.  
Furthermore, changes in a country’s creditor rights affect the M&A activity in a 
similar direction: the extent diversification increases following the strengthening 
of creditor rights and declines if they are weakened.   
 
(2) In countries with stronger creditor rights, there is a lower level of operating risk, 
measured by the standard deviation of firms’ ROA.  
 
                                                 
1 Stockholders can expropriate value by diversion of cashflow or by risk shifting (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). The latter means that 
when the firm approaches default, stockholders are induced to take on excessive risk which result in shifting value from creditors to 
stockholders. 
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Overall, these results are strongest (statistically as well as economically) for the 
creditor rights corresponding to whether there is no automatic stay on secured creditors 
(AUTOSTAY) and whether management is replaced in bankruptcy (MANAGES).  For 
example, MANAGES affects the likelihood of a merger being in the same industry by 
6.6% (based on Table 3) where the standard deviation of this likelihood across countries 
is 10.3%.  Similarly, MANAGES lowers the operating risk measured at the country level 
by around 3% (based on Table 8) where the cross-country standard deviation of operating 
risk is 2%.  Thus, the effect of creditor rights on corporate investment policy seems 
reasonably large. 
Since countries differ in the composition of their industries, and since the 
propensity to diversify or reduce risk may differ across industries, we test the relationship 
between creditor rights and diversifying mergers after controlling for the industry effect 
following the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998). We find that after controlling 
for the industry effect, the findings in (1) and (2) above still hold.  
 
(3) In countries with strong creditor rights, target firms whose assets have high 
recovery value in default (or distress) are more likely to be acquired by firms 
whose assets have low recovery value. This is because high recovery value of 
assets may enable firms in distress to defer default by liquidating some of these 
assets and using the proceeds to service the debt.  Thus, by acquiring a high-
recovery target, a low-recovery firm reduces the likelihood of default in case of 
distress. 
 
Our analysis focuses on M&As since they provide a unique opportunity to 
observe the type of a major corporate investment and its potential effect on corporate risk 
– whether the acquisition is diversifying (across industries) or focusing (within-industry).  
Diversifying M&As create firms whose revenue is not concentrated in a few business 
segments (pertaining to different industries). Such firms have been found to have 
significantly lower idiosyncratic risk (Comment and Jarrell (1995)).  Diversifying 
conglomerate mergers are found by Amihud and Lev (1981) to be associated with 
managerial motivation to reduce risk.  In M&As, we can also identify clearly the nature 
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of the assets in which the company is investing – whether they have high or low recovery 
value.  Also important, especially for our setting, corporate investment in the form of 
M&A is not tainted by cross-country differences in accounting and disclosure practices 
that affect other measures of investment such as capital expenditures and R&D.  
However, we recognize that firms employ other, likely difficult to observe, means to 
reduce risks, and therefore we also analyze the overall operating risk of firms. 
Our paper is related to both the literature on diversification by firms and on the 
effect of claimholder rights in a country on firm’s investment and financial choices. 
Managerial interests are shown to affect both investment and financing choices by firms. 
Amihud and Lev (1981) and Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003 suggest that managerial 
agency problem – aversion to risk or private benefits due to empire building – leads to 
conglomeration. Our paper suggests that managers may be averse to risk – and 
consequently diversify and reduce operating risk – because of the private cost in case of 
default.  Gilson (1989) documents that following severe decline in stock performance, 
firms with leverage are almost thrice as likely to fire top-level management compared to 
firms that are not distressed. Importantly, the laid-off managers are not employed in 
publicly listed companies for another three years, implying that managers of distressed 
firms suffer significant private cost.  Gilson suggests that this cost may induce managers 
to employ risk-reducing policies such as diversifying mergers and favoring less risky 
investments.  Gilson also finds that a substantial portion of managerial layoff upon 
distress is due to direct intervention by bank lenders, a finding that is more recently 
supported by Ozelge (2007).  Baird and Rassmussen (2006) too highlight the role of 
lenders in affecting changes the firm’s management, including board members.  Eckbo 
and Thornburn (2003) find that in Sweden, where bankruptcy filing automatically 
terminates the manager’s employment, managers incur large loss of private benefits of 
control, which induces them to invest conservatively.  
Throughout the paper, exploit as explanatory variable the variation of creditor 
rights across countries in their bankruptcy codes. Djankov et al. (2007a) show evidence 
that creditor rights have changed little between late 1970s and early 1990s, the beginning 
of our dataset. Therefore, we can consider creditor rights in a country to be a function of 
its legal origin and largely exogenous to the nature of the country’s overall corporate 
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investment. Even the few creditor right changes within a country, whose effects we 
analyze, are often motivated by exogenous forces such as promoting employment, 
recovering from crises, transition from socialist to capitalist regimes, among others.  
The impact of creditor rights on investment policy is examined in a number of 
recent studies. Manso (2005) and Landier (2006) focus theoretically on the de-motivating 
effect on innovation and entrepreneurship of tough outcomes for entrepreneurs upon 
failure (strong creditor rights, being an example). Acharya and Subramanian (2007) 
embed the choice of leverage as well as innovation in a theoretical setting and also show 
empirically that strong creditor rights bear significantly negatively on corporate 
innovation, measured by the intensity of patent creation and citation by firms. While their 
evidence is based on cross-country and time-series analysis, Chava and Roberts (2008) 
and Nini, Smith and Sufi (2006) consider the effect on firm-level investments of creditor 
rights, exploiting the within-US variation in the form of covenants and capital 
expenditure restrictions explicitly contained in debt contracts. 
Creditor rights and their enforcement are shown to affect the extent of debt 
financing. Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007a, 2007b) document that creditor rights 
such as MANAGES and AUTOSTAY are associated with higher aggregate lending, in the 
cross-section of countries as well as in time-series around creditor rights changes. 
Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2006) study lending in Central and East European countries 
and find that it is the improvement in enforcement of creditor rights, for example, due to 
the creation of a collateral registry, that boosts lending rather than an increase in creditor 
rights such as MANAGES and AUTOSTAY. This literature mostly focuses on financing 
choices, taking as given the investment choices of firms. Our paper argues that 
investment choices of firms also respond to creditor rights.  Adler (1992) suggests that 
while strong creditor rights induce the manager to increase the firm’s risk as the firm 
approaches default, their ex-ante effect is to reduce risk and avoid insolvency.  Our model 
directly analyzes the propensity of stockholders to take risks and shows the tradeoffs, 
given creditor rights.  
Finally, another set of complementary papers examines legal institutions other 
than creditor rights in bankruptcy. Rossi and Volpin (2004) document that strong 
shareholder rights play an important role in determining the volume and number of 
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mergers and acquisitions across countries. John, Litov and Yeung (2007) show evidence 
that investor protection is an important determinant of the risk-taking incentives of 
corporate insiders.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a model of the causal 
effect of creditor rights on corporate investment choice. Section 3 discusses the data and 




We present a stylized model to analyze the effect of creditor rights on firm’s risk-
taking incentives. In particular, the model examines the effect of reorganization outcomes 
for management and shareholders of a distressed firm on the ex-ante investments of the 
firm.  The time-line of the model is presented in Figure 1.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE. 
 
Consider a firm at date 0 that is run by an owner/entrepreneur (the “manager” of 
the firm).  The firm has made some past investment (say I units) and has some existing 
debt in place of face value F which is maturing at date 1.2  The manager can choose at 
date 0 the risk of the firm’s future cash flows to be realized from this investment at date 
1. We adopt the technology for choice of risk from a part of the banking literature, 
starting with the models of Blum (1999, 2002) and Allen and Gale (2000).  The risk 
choices at date 0 are indexed by y ≥ 0, which represents the firm’s cash flow in case the 
investment succeeds at date 1. Success is likely with probability p(y), where 0 < p(y) < 1, 
p’(y) < 0, and p’’(y) < 0.  With remaining likelihood, [1 – p(y)], the investment fails at 
date 1 and produces cash flow of zero. Thus, y is also an index for the risk of default of 
the firm:  Greater y reduces the likelihood of success p(y) (in a concave fashion).  Agents 
are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate of interest is zero. 
                                                 
2 We do not model the choice of leverage and its benefits and costs.  Our empirical tests will, however, control for potential 
endogeneity of leverage to creditor rights.  Acharya, Sundaram and John (2004) provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of how 
leverage responds to creditor rights in a cross-country setting. 
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At date 0, the owner/manager makes the choice of risk, maximizing equity value 
net of creditor payments, and anticipating the outcomes from resolution of distress (if 
any) at date 1.   
In case of default at date 1, the continuation prospects of the firm depend upon 
managerial quality. Managerial ability at date 1 may be either high or low with equal 
probabilities.  We assume that neither the firm nor the manager know this ability unless it 
is investigated at date 1, as we explain below.  Also, for simplicity, we assume that 
managerial ability does not affect the date-0 investment.  In other words, managers are 
assumed to be randomly endowed at date 1 to be high or low type with equal likelihood. 
In case of default at date 1, a firm operating under a high-ability manager yields 
cash flow of H while a low-ability manager yields zero cash flow.  If the firm is 
liquidated to outsiders and ceases to exist, it will fetch cash flow of L.  We assume that 
2L < F < H.  The following are the possible outcomes upon default, which occurs if the 
realization from the investment is zero. 
(1) With probability r (r > 0), the firm is liquidated to outsiders by creditors, which 
yields L.  This may occur due to failure amongst the different creditors of the firm 
to agree on a reorganization outcome (we discuss below possible explanations for 
such a failure). 
(2) With probability q (q > 0), creditors investigate the type of management and find 
it out. Then, if the manager’s ability is found to be low, the manager is fired and 
the firm is liquidated, realizing cashflow of L. If the manager’s ability is found to 
be high, the firm continues with the current manager and realizes cash flow H. 
The likelihood of each such event occurring is 0.5. 
(3) With the remaining probability of (1 – q – r) (assumed positive), creditors are 
unable to learn managerial type and proceed with the current manager. This will 
yield H or 0 with probability of 0.5. If the high outcome H is sufficiently high 
compared to proceeds from liquidation (we assumed that 0.5H > L), creditors are 
better off if the firm continues compared to liquidation even if the manager type 
in unknown. 
Assumption (2) is consistent with empirical evidence.  For example, Eckbo and 
Thornton (2003) find that in Sweden, where creditor rights include the automatic firing of 
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the manager in default, some firms rehire the dismissed manager with the rehiring 
probability increasing in managerial quality.3 
If manager is found to be of low quality and is fired (probability of 0.5q) or the 
firm fails to reorganize and is liquidated (probability of r), managers are assumed to 
suffer a private cost of m > 0 due to loss of reputation or private benefits of control. This 
assumption is consistent with empirical evidence. Gilson (1989), Baird and Rasmussen 
(2006) and Ozelge (2007) find that upon distress, there is a significantly higher 
probability of top-management dismissal, especially due to direct intervention by lending 
banks, compared to firms not in distress. Gilson also documents that managers dismissed 
in distress suffer a significant private cost in the form of future employment 
opportunities. Eckbo and Thornton (2003) find that in Sweden, managers of bankrupt 
companies suffer a median (abnormal) income loss of 47%.  
The assumed inefficiency in reorganization, which leads to liquidation rather than 
continuation, reflects creditors’ failure to reach an agreement amongst themselves 
regarding bankruptcy proceedings.  For example, suppose that firm’s debt of face value F 
consists of secured debt of amount F1 and unsecured debt of amount (F - F1), where F1 < 
L. Suppose also that secured creditors have claim to all assets of the firm and there is no 
automatic stay on secured creditors’ rights. Then, since secured creditors are fully 
covered under liquidation but face some default risk in case firm is continued (and 
managerial type turns out to be low), they have incentives to liquidate the firm. In 
contrast, unsecured creditors value the continuation outcome. Thus, there is a conflict of 
interest amongst creditors whether to expend any time and effort in learning about 
managerial type at all: secured creditors may just prefer to seize and liquidate the assets. 
Such reorganization failure is also more likely if reorganization petition requires majority 
consent of creditors and secured (or more generally, senior) creditors can block 
continuation in favor of liquidation. Another possibility (outside of our model) is that 
firm’s continuation requires additional financing, but due to debt overhang problem, this 
can be raised only if the firm can arrange supra-priority financing, such as the debtor-in-
possession financing in the United States. However, if creditor rights do not allow 
                                                 
3 Managerial quality is increasing in the firm industry-adjusted pre-bankruptcy operating performance and the recovery rate of its 
debt, and decreasing in the trustee’s evaluation of the manager and in the delay from insolvency to filing. 
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secured creditors’ claims to be subordinated in this way, then no continuation may be 
feasible, resulting in liquidation of the firm. 
We assume the probabilities q and r to be a property of the legal environment in 
which the firm operates, namely of the country’s creditor rights.  These parameters map 
directly into their empirical counterparts of creditor right scores (as measured, for 
example, in LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)).  The empirical 
counterpart for q is the score MANAGES, which equals 1 if management is not retained in 
bankruptcy.  The counterpart for r is the set of other creditor right scores, namely 
AUTOSTAY, SECURED and REORG. These correspond to there being no automatic stay 
on secured creditors’ rights, secured creditors being paid first, and reorganization 
requiring creditors’ consent, which as explained above could lead to failure to reorganize 
due to disagreement amongst creditors. In our model, while MANAGES leads to more 
information about managerial type and therefore better continuation and liquidation 
decisions, the other three creditor rights result in inefficient liquidations of the firm. 
However, all these creditor rights impose a private cost on management and induce in 
them aversion to risk. We derive this result next. 
 In the presence of leverage and risk of default, the owner/manager chooses the 
risk y to maximize the expected value of equity net of the private costs from distress, 
given as: 
p(y) [y – F] + [1 – p(y)] [  – (r + 0.5 q) m + (0.5 q + 0.5(1 – q  – r)) (H – F) ]. (1) 
This expression reflects the fact that management suffers a private cost m when the firm 
is liquidated – either due to failure to reorganize or due to revelation of his type being 
low - and has residual value in distress in other cases provided there is excess cash flow 
after creditors are paid off. This latter scenario has a probability of (0.5 q + 0.5(1 – q –r)) 
since there is excess cash flow after paying creditors only if managerial type is 
discovered by creditors to be high and firm is continued (probability of 0.5 q) or if 
managerial type is not discovered but it turns out ex post to be high. 
The optimal choice of risk for the levered firm y* is thus given by the first-order 
condition: 
p(y) + p’(y) [ y – F + (r + 0.5 q) m – 0.5 (1 – r) (H – F) ] = 0 ,        (2) 
and, the second-order derivative is 
 9
 2 p’(y) + p’’(y) [ y – F + (r + 0.5 q) m – 0.5 (1  – r) (H – F)] .         (3) 
Note that since p’(y) < 0 at the optimal risk choice y*, we must have  
[ y – F + (r + 0.5 q) m – 0.5 (1  – r) (H – F)]  > 0 ,    (4) 
so that the second-order derivative above is negative and the first-order condition indeed 
gives the optimum that maximizes the objective of manager.4 
 The three terms after y inside [.] in the condition (4) for y*  illustrate the additional 
effects on risk-taking for a levered firm.  The first term, –F, reflects the fact that a levered 
firm has incentives to shift risk given equity’s “option” like payoff at date 1.  This effect 
is however not sensitive to creditor right parameters q and r. The second term (r + 0.5 
q)m reflects the risk-aversion induced in managerial objective by the fact that 
management suffers a private cost upon being fired.  This effect is increasing in r, the 
failure of creditors to agree on reorganization, and also increasing in q, the likelihood that 
management is fired in bankruptcy, both assumed to be a property of the creditor rights of 
the country.  The third term – 0.5 (1 – r) (H – F) also corresponds to a risk-shifting 
incentive.  This is the “option” effect from date 2 when the firm is continued.  Crucially, 
the magnitude of this effect diminishes in r, the likelihood that creditors fail to allow the 
firm to be efficiently reorganized in bankruptcy. 
 To summarize, creditor rights that replace management in distress and that are 
less likely to lead to a reorganization outcome discourage ex-ante risk-taking by firm’s 
management.   We can prove these two results formally as follows. Denoting the first-
order condition for management’s optimization as f (y*(q,r), q, r) = 0, the second-order 
condition implies δf / δq < 0.  In turn, taking the derivative of f with respect to q or r, and 
applying the implicit-function theorem gives 
 
(i) sign (dy* / dq) = sign (δf / δq), which is negative since   (5) 




                                                 
4 To see this, note that since p(y) > 0 and p’(y) < 0, the expression p(y) + p’(y) [y – x] is greater than zero for all y <= x. Hence, the 
solution to the equation p(y) + p’(y) [y – x] = 0 must satisfy y > x. 
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(ii) sign (dy* / dr) = sign (δf / δr), which is also negative since  (6) 
δf / δr = p’(y) [ m + 0.5 (H  – F)] < 0. 
 
Thus, the risk undertaken by a levered firm declines in the likelihood that 
management is fired in distress and that reorganizations promoting continuations of the 




3. Data and Empirical Design  
 
In studying the effects of creditor rights on corporate propensity to take risk, we 
conduct a number of tests.  First, we examine whether the propensity of firms to diversify 
through mergers and acquisitions and test if this propensity increases as a function of the 
country’s creditor rights, both in the cross-section of countries and in time-series, around 
changes in creditor rights of a country.  Here, we directly observe the action that 
companies take in order to affect their risk.  Since most companies can reduce their risk 
by applying other means that may be difficult to observe directly, we also conduct a 
second test of whether companies’ operating risk is decreasing in creditor rights.  Both of 
these tests are conducted in two ways.  In one, the unit of observation is a transaction, and 
in the other, we look at country averages.  
The results of these tests are overall consistent with our model. In countries with 
strong creditor rights, there is greater propensity of companies to do diversifying 
acquisitions. In general, operating risk is lower in countries with strong creditor rights.  
Below, we describe our data, tests and results in greater detail. Details of how our various 
variables are constructed are provided in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. 
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3.1. Creditor Rights 
 
The data on creditor rights is taken from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998), whose sample contains data for 49 countries, and records creditor rights 
provisions in the cross-country sample as of 1994.  The variable CRIGHTS is the sum of 
four provisions: AUTOSTAY, the absence of automatic stay on the assets of the debtor in 
reorganization; REORG, the requirement of creditors’ consent or minimum dividend for a 
debtor to file for reorganization; SECURED, ranking secured creditors first in the 
disposition of assets of the bankrupt firm upon filing for reorganization; and MANAGES, 
the removal of management from managing the activities of the firm upon filing for 
reorganization.  Each of these provisions takes a value of 1, if it is present in the 
country’s bankruptcy code or zero if it is absent.  Consequently, the range of values for 
CRIGHTS is 0 through 4.  We also use the extended sample and detailed creditor rights 
data of Djankov et al. (2007a) to examine the impact of changes in creditor rights on the 
subsequent corporate risk-taking.   
 
3.2. Creditor rights and diversification in M&A activity 
 
Our first set of tests is based on measuring corporate risk reduction through 
diversification, using the mergers and acquisitions activity in countries. The data on 
acquisitions is obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC)’s Platinum Mergers 
& Acquisitions database for the period 1994-2004.  We consider only mergers where 
both the acquirer and the target are in the same country, thus being under the same 
jurisdiction as it applies to creditor rights.  We exclude acquisitions where acquirer comes 
from the financial industry (SIC header 6) or a regulated industry (SIC headers 48 and 
49) since for such acquirers, the motives for diversification may be linked to regulatory 
requirements to reduce risk and therefore may differ from those presented in our model.  
We further exclude transactions where the acquirer and the target are the same company 
(repurchases recorded as acquisitions), transactions where the acquirer is a mutual 
company, investment company, subsidiary, or state-owned enterprise, and transactions in 
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which the percentage acquired from the target is less than 20 percent.5  Finally, we 
include only countries with more than 50 transactions that satisfy the above criteria in our 
sample period. Additional data requirements related to the control variables, in particular 
the value of creditor rights as of 1994, reduce our sample to 38 countries, for which we 
present descriptive statistics in Table 2.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. 
 
We first test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis I: The propensity to do diversifying acquisitions increases in the strength of 
the country’s creditor rights. 
 
This hypothesis is tested first by estimating the likelihood of same-industry 
acquisition in a country as a function of the creditor rights in that country, and a set of 
control variables. An acquisition of a firm that is not in the same industry (defined by the 
2-digit SIC code) is considered diversifying.6   Comment and Jarrell (1995) show that 
focused firms (firms whose revenue is concentrated in a fewer segments) have 
significantly higher idiosyncratic risk.  Hence, diversifying acquisitions reduce risk by 
reducing revenue concentration.  By our hypothesis, the likelihood of same-industry 
mergers and acquisitions in a country should be a decreasing function of the strength of 
creditor rights.  This is studied both at the level of individual acquisitions and at the 
aggregate country level.  For individual transactions, we examine the likelihood of a 
target firm being in the same industry as the acquirer (Table 3). For the aggregate country 
level, we analyze the proportion of the same-industry domestic mergers from all domestic 
mergers in the sample period (Tables 4 and 5). 
The explanatory variables that we employ in our analysis are as follows. First and 
foremost is the measure of creditor rights, the CRIGHTS score from La Porta et al. 
                                                 
5 Our results are robust to a less conservative selection approach, e.g. if we consider all transactions with at least 10% acquired. Our 
results are also unchanged when we examine a more conservative sample, e.g. consider only transactions in which the acquirer obtains 
at least 51% of the company, the transaction value is at least 1 million US$, the transaction represents at least 1% of the total assets of 
the acquirer, and the transaction is completed within three years of the announcement of the deal. These latter selection criteria are 
similar to those in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). 
6 The results are qualitatively similar when we employ industry classification at the 3-digit SIC level. 
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(1998), and its components, AUTOSTAY, REORG, SECURED and MANAGES.  The 
prediction is that the likelihood of same-industry mergers is lower in countries with 
stronger creditor rights.  
As control variables, we include shareholder rights index, SHRIGHTS, which may 
positively affect the likelihood of same-industry mergers if they benefit shareholders 
(Rossi and Volpin, 2004). We include Rule of Law as a proxy for the character of legal 
rules and the quality of law enforcement, which could influence the development of 
financial markets (La Porta et al., 1997), and through that channel influence economic 
growth and the nature of mergers.7  We also control for Legal Origin, as creditor- and 
shareholder rights are both influenced by the legal origins (La Porta et al., 1998). These 
three legal control variables are obtained from Levine and Demirguc-Kunt (2001) and 
LaPorta et al. (1998).  Their use is also supported by the finding of Classens and Klapper 
(2005) that they interact with the likelihood of bankruptcies in a country and with creditor 
rights. 
As additional controls, we employ macroeconomic volatility, as it may impact the 
risk-taking of corporate insiders. We include a direct measure of the country’s 
macroeconomic risk, MacroRisk, the standard deviation of quarterly changes in the 
country’s index of industrial production.8  It will have negative coefficient if managers in 
riskier countries do more diversifying mergers. We also include the logarithm of the 
country’s average real GDP per-capita over 1994-2000 from the Penn World Table 
Version 6.1 as a proxy for the degree of economic development. The latter control is 
necessary as developed and developing countries may have different investment 
opportunity sets (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). Furthermore, this variable is used in 
other studies of cross-country comparisons and is perceived to reflect hard-to-quantify 
country-level characteristics.  In the individual merger regression (Table 3), we also 
control for transaction size and leverage.  We include the Transaction Value (the 
logarithm of the amount paid in US dollars), which shows significant heterogeneity 
across firms in our sample. And, since leverage may affect the firm’s investment policy, 
                                                 
7 LaPorta et al. (1997) point out that stock market capitalization or the total assets of financial institutions are endogenous to economic 
development, shareholder rights, creditor rights, rule of law, and legal origins. Therefore, we do not control for these variables. Instead 
of including these (outcome) proxies for equity and debt market development, we include only the (primitive) institutional variables as 
controls.  
8 See Table 1 for details. 
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we add two leverage control variables: The acquirer’s leverage and the target’s leverage. 
To get around the endogeneity of leverage, both at the firm level and at the country level 
(since leverage in a country is affected by its creditor’s rights, as well as by other country 
characteristics), we assign as leverage of each firm – both bidder and target – the rank of 
the industry’s leverage in the U.S., which has a low level of creditor rights (CRIGHTS= 
1). For that end, we calculate the median leverage, defined as [(total liabilities – deferred 
taxes) / total assets] of firms in each U.S. 2-digit SIC code industry over the years 1992-
2005, we then rank the industries by their median leverage and divide them into quartiles.  
The leverage assigned to an acquirer firm in any country is then the number of the 
leverage quartile to which its industry belongs. Leverage quartile numbers go from 1 to 4, 
4 being the highest leverage quartile.  Finally, to address concerns of covariance across 
residuals of same-country cases, we follow Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) in 
clustering the standard errors at the country level (in the OLS regressions). The estimated 
model is 
 
Pr(same industry merger) = α*CRIGHTS + control variables.          (7) 
 
The dependent variable equals 1 if the merger or acquisition is in the same 2-digit 
industry. Our hypothesis implies that α < 0. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. 
 
The results, presented in Table 3, strongly support our hypothesis. The coefficient of 
CRIGHTS is negative and statistically significant (column 1), meaning that stronger 
creditor rights are associated with lower probability of same-industry merger in the 
country. The creditor rights components that affect this result most significantly (columns 
2 through 5) are AUTOSTAY and MANAGES. The latter, representing the requirement 
that management does not retain administration of the firm pending the resolution of the 
reorganization, is the most important determinant (both statistically and economically) of 
the decision to acquire a same-industry firm, with its effect being more than thrice as 
strong as the overall effect of CRIGHTS. The results remain the same when we exclude 
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the United States from the sample which has by far the largest number of mergers 
(column 6). 
The negative effect of CRIGHTS on same-industry acquisitions is also obtained 
when we test our hypothesis by a random effects probit model (Guilkey and Murphy, 
1993). The results are presented in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3. The coefficient on 
creditor rights is highly statistically significant, regardless of whether we include all 38 
countries or only 37, excluding the U.S.  
Regarding the other variables, SHRIGHTS has positive – although not significant 
– coefficient. MacroRisk has negative coefficient, meaning that in countries with greater 
macroeconomic risk, there is greater tendency of firms to do diversifying mergers.  
Target firm leverage has a significant negative effect on the propensity to do same-
industry mergers, while acquirer’s leverage has a positive effect that is insignificant when 
excluding the U.S. 
As robustness check, we re-estimated the model in Table 3 with a variable that 
captures the strength of antitrust law in a country, following Hylton and Deng (2006). 
They provide a score of the antitrust law as it pertains to mergers for 2004.  While this 
date is at the end of our sample period, we use it (for lack of another index) assuming that 
the law has hardly changed over the years. Hylton and Deng’s list includes 35 countries 
that overlap with ours, to which we add data on Hong Kong and Singapore.10  We find 
that this variable, when included in the regression, has insignificant effect.  Still, there is 
a negative and significant effects of CRIGHTS and its components, AUTOSTAY and 
MANAGES, as before. 
We also examine the effect of cultural differences, following Stulz and 
Williamson (2003). In particular, we control for the religious composition of the 
population.  Our results on the effect of creditor rights and its components are unchanged.  
Finally, we examine the effect of the means of financing of the acquisitions by 
adding a dummy variable that equals 1 for cash only transactions.  Naturally, this variable 
is endogenous.  Still, its effect is insignificant in the regression of all countries, while in 
the regression that excludes the U.S., its coefficient is positive and significant: 0.035 with 
                                                 
10 For Singapore, it is for 2006. 
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t = 2.42.  Still, the coefficient of CRIGHTS remains negative and significant. In the 
regression that excludes the U.S., the coefficient is -0.013 (t = 2.54). 
 
Next, we test our hypothesis at the aggregate country level, where each country is 
one observation. Here, large and small countries are treated alike. We calculate for each 
country the measure PROP, the proportion of same-industry domestic mergers from all 
domestic mergers in the sample period. Since PROP is a ratio bounded between 0 and 1, 
we employ the Theil transformation of the share of same industry mergers: 
 
PROP  =  ln [ SAME / (1-SAME) ],               (8) 
 
where SAME is the proportion of acquisitions in the same two-digit SIC code industry. 
 
INSTER TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the model (c denoting a country):  
 
PROPc = β0 + β1*CRIGHTSc + controls.             (9) 
 
Our hypothesis that β1 < 0 is again supported by the data. The coefficient of 
CRIGHTS is negative and significant (column 1). When looking at the components 
(columns 2 through 5), we observe again that AUTOSTAY and MANAGES have negative 
coefficients, although only MANAGES is highly statistically significant, and its effect is 
four times as large as the overall effect of CRIGHTS.  The coefficient of SECURED is 
also negative and marginally significant.  If secured creditors are always paid first, then 
violations of absolute priority rule are smaller and management and shareholders 
anticipate receiving less in a reorganization of the firm, which in turn induces them to 
take less risk.  The negative effect of CRIGHTS on same-industry mergers is similar in 
column (6), when using the weighted average CRIGHTS over the sample period. The 
weights are the number of transaction in the years following the year of change in one of 
the CRIGHTS components, since a change in the law is reflected in transactions in 
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subsequent years. The calculation of this variable employs the time series data of the 
CRIGHTS components in Djankov et al. (2007a).  Again, as robustness check we include 
in the model the merger index from Hylton and Deng (2006). Its coefficient is 
insignificant, while the coefficient of CRIGHTS remains negative and significant. 
Figure 2 plots the variable PROP for different countries as a function of their 
CRIGHTS and also shows the best fit implied by column (1) of Table 4, illustrating well 
the negative relationship between strength of creditor rights and the extent of same-
industry mergers. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE. 
 
 To check the robustness of the main results to sample period selection, we again 
estimate the relationship between PROP and CRIGHTS across countries, splitting the 
sample period into two, 1994-1999 and 2000-2004, and calculating PROP for each 
subperiod. In this regression, we allow for unbalanced panel, excluding one sub-period 
for a given country if it does not have at least 30 transactions in that sub-period. The 
results, presented in Table 5, again support our hypothesis: creditor rights (especially, no 
automatic stay on the assets and no stay for management in distress) have a significant 
negative effect on the proportion of same-industry mergers. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE. 
 
3.3. The effects of changes in creditor rights on diversification in M&A activity 
 
Our analysis so far has shown a negative association between a country’s creditor 
rights and the propensity of firms to engage in same-industry acquisitions. Six countries 
in our sample underwent changes in their creditor rights provisions during our sample 
period: Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Russia11, Sweden, and Thailand. The changes in all these 
countries implied a decrease by one unit in creditor rights, except for Russia which had a 
                                                 
11 Russia is included only in this table’s regressions, not in any other estimation, since it has a unique legal origin. Then, its inclusion 
with a unique dummy variable for its legal origin will not change any of the results reported.  
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decrease in 1998 and an increase in 2002. We use these changes in creditor rights to 
examine whether the propensity of firms to engage in same-industry mergers responded 
to changes in CRIGHTS.  The changes in the bankruptcy code in these countries can be 
reasonably assumed to be exogenous. They were driven mainly by financial crises 
(Indonesia, Russia, and Thailand), the need to collect state tax (Russia, 1998) or 
emulation of the U.S. when switching from more centrally-controlled economy.  
Given this backdrop of creditor rights changes in our sample, we estimate the 
following regression which is a variant of the estimation employed in Table 3: 
 
Pr(same industry merger) = α*ΔCRIGHTSc + control variables.        (10) 
 
The change in CRIGHTS of country c, denoted ΔCRIGHTSc, equals 0 during the 
period following the weakening of CRIGHTS (the year of the change and the years that 
follow), and ΔCRIGHTSc = 1 during the period that precedes it, when CRIGHTS are 
stronger. Similarly, ΔCRIGHTSc = 1 during the period when CRIGHTS are stonger 
compared to the previous period of weaker CRIGHTS, during which ΔCRIGHTSc = 0.  As 
discussed, all changes in CRIGHTS during the sample period but one made them weaker. 
For most countries in our sample, ΔCRIGHTS = 0 for the entire sample period (i.e., no 
change).  By our hypotheses, we expect that α < 0. That is, the propensity to engage in 
same-industry mergers rises if CRIGHTS declines from 1 to 0. 
 The control variables are the industry fixed effects, the legal origins (not reported) 
and the logarithm of acquisition size. We further include year fixed effects and, 
importantly, country fixed effects in line with the difference-in-differences methodology. 
We estimate the regression by both linear probability (OLS) and Probit models. We have 
in this regression 29,567 observations.12  
  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE. 
 
                                                 
12 Our observation count in the changes regression is lower than in Table 3 because of data requirement: having creditor rights data 
from Djankov et al. (2007a) on an annual basis for the sample period 1994-2004. This study’s data however ends in 2002. 
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The regression results in Table 6 show that in both OLS and random effects probit 
analysis, the coefficient on changes in creditor rights is negative and statistically 
significant, as hypothesized. In particular, the reported coefficient from the random 
effects probit model corresponds to a marginal effect of -0.240 with z-stat of -2.48. The 
results thus strongly support our hypothesis that changes in CRIGHTS which weaken 
them reduce the propensity of firms to diversify through mergers and acquisitions. 
 
3.4. Creditor rights and firms’ operating risk 
We now present a new and independent test of the relationship between creditor 
rights and corporate risk. So far we have shown that the propensity to engage in 
diversifying mergers is greater in countries in which creditor rights are strong.  However, 
diversifying acquisitions are not the only means for companies to reduce their risk. Firms 
can reduce risk by other means which are not directly observed. Therefore, we now 
measure directly the level of corporate risk and relate it to the creditor rights in the 
country. 
 
Hypothesis II: The volatility of return on firms’ assets is decreasing in the strength of the 
country’s creditor rights. 
 
The risk of corporate operations of firm j in country c, RISKj,c, is computed as the 
standard deviation of corporate return on assets, using data from Compustat Global 
Vantage. We first calculate the ratio Ej,c,t = EBITDAj,c,t /ASSETSj,c,t where EBITDAj,c,t is 
the sum of operating income after depreciation (data item #14) and depreciation and 
amortization expenses (data item #11),13 and ASSETSi,c,t is the contemporaneous total 
assets (data item #89). Data are annual. Ej,c,t is calculated for the years 1992-2005, and 
the entire sample of Ej,c,t is winsorized at 0.5% in both tails of the distribution to account 
for possible data errors and large outliers. RISKj,c is calculated as the standard deviation 
of the Ej,c,t series.  The entire sample of RISKj,c is again winsorized at 1% in both tails of 
                                                 
13 We use EBITDA rather than EBIT since countries differ in the way they recognize accounting depreciation, which affect the 
smoothing of earnings over time. 
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its distribution to eliminate outliers. We include only firms in the manufacturing 
industries14 with data for at least eight years in 1992-2005.   
 The estimation model regresses RISKj,c on CRIGHTSj,c and a set of control 
variables: 
 
RISKj,c = γ*CRIGHTSj,c + control variables.           (11) 
 
As in the case of diversifying M&As, we estimate this model at two levels of 
aggregation: at the firm level (Table 7) and at the country level (Table 8), using the 
average risk of the firms in the country. By our hypothesis, the coefficient γ of CRIGHTS 
is negative. The model also includes company’s size (logarithm of its initial total assets, 
as of the beginning its sample data). It is commonly assumed that larger firms are less 
risky.  The model also includes the assigned company’s leverage, the rank its industry of 
quartile (1 to 4) of the median industry leverage as measured for industries in the U.S. It 
is assumed that this leverage represents the inherent leverage rank of the industry and 
serves as an instrument for the firm’s leverage. This is because the firm’s own leverage in 
endogenous.   
The estimation of the model of single-firm risk level is done as a panel regression, 
and the residual standard errors are country-clustered. This regression includes only 35 
countries because three countries have insufficient data (we require at least 6 firms in a 
country), giving us a total of 5,376 firms for the firm-level analysis.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE. 
 
 The firm-level results in Table 7, columns (1) through (5), support our hypothesis. 
The coefficient of RISK on CRIGHTS is negative and significant. As in the earlier results 
on same-industry mergers (Tables 3-5), the most significant components of CRIGHTS 
that negatively affect RISK are AUTOSTAY and MANAGES. The effect of MANAGES, in 
particular, remains far larger than the overall effect of CRIGHTS, as in Tables 3-5 and 
larger than the effect of AUTOSTAY or any other component of CRIGHTS. The results on 
                                                 
14 We exclude utilities and financial firms which are regulated to various extent in different countries. 
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the effect of CRIGHTS are qualitatively unchanged when the U.S. is excluded from the 
regression (column (6)).  Among the control variables, both assigned firm leverage and 
firm size have negative and significant effect on the choice of the company risk level. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE. 
 
 In Table 8, we estimate the RISK-CRIGHTS relationship at the country level, 
instead of at the firm level as in Table 7. Here, all countries are treated alike, each being a 
single observation. The dependent variable is RISK*, the average of the individual firms’ 
risk measure RISK. The results again support our hypothesis. The coefficient of 
CRIGHTS is negative and significant at better than 5%, even though we have only 25 
degrees of freedom in this regression. As before, the significant components of CRIGHTS 
are AUTOSTAY and MANAGES, with the latter being the most effective component of 
CRIGHTS. 
In an un-reported robustness test, we use alternative definitions of RISK, such as 
logarithm of RISK and the definition of operating risk variability from John, Litov and 
Yeung (2007).15 Our results are qualitatively unchanged. 
 We have thus established through an independent test that in countries with 
stronger creditor rights, firms have lower operating risk. 
 
3.5. Industry-adjusted propensity to reduce risk 
 
Since countries may differ in the intensities of different industries in them, 
differences between countries may reflect differences between them in the composition 
of their industries rather than in their CRIGHTS.  Firms in each industry may have 
intrinsic or technological (industry-specific) propensity to merge within the industry and 
to choose certain level of risk (for example, due to the industry’s production function).  
To account for this consideration, we employ the method of Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
We compare the realized propensity of acquirers to choose targets in the same industry, 
                                                 
15
 In John, Litov, Yeung (2007), the annual firm’s return-on-asset ratio is calculated as the deviation of the firm’s EBITDA/ASSET 
from the country’s corresponding average ratio for that year.  The standard deviation is calculated from these deviations. 
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and of firms to choose some level of operating risk, with the inherent such characteristic 
of the industry, and relate the difference between the two to difference in the countries’ 
CRIGHTS.  
As proxy for the inherent industry characteristic – the industry propensity to do 
within-industry mergers and to choose some level of operational risk – we use the 
respective characteristic in the United States, as do Rajan and Zingales (1998). The 
United States is appropriate because for the U.S., CRIGHTS is low (it equals 1) and 
hence, the industry characteristics in it is relatively less likely to manifest corporate or 
management aversion to risk-taking induced by creditors’ rights. In addition, the U.S. has 
the most developed financial market, the most active takeover market and relatively little 
constraints on corporate behavior.  Consequently, we employ the proportion of same-
industry M&A acquisitions in the U.S. as a proxy for the technological or inherent 
propensity of firms in an industry to do same-industry acquisitions, and we use the 
average of operating risk of the firms in U.S. industries as a proxy of the industry 
inherent risk. 
For the inherent propensity of a firm to do within-industry mergers we calculate 
PROPj,US (j is the acquirer’s industry), the ratio of the same industry mergers from total 
mergers for 2-digit SIC code industries in the U.S. for the period 1994-1997. We 
compute similarly PROPj,c for all other countries for the subsequent period, 1998-2004.  
The criterion for including an industry from a given country is having at least six 
qualified transactions in that industry during the period 1998-2004, and the calculation of 
PROPj,US requires at least six qualified transactions in that industry during 1994-1997.  
Following the model in Rajan and Zingales (1998), we then estimate the model 
 
PROPj,c = β0 +β1*PROPj,US + β2*CRIGHTSc* PROPj,US + β3*CRIGHTSc +controls  (12) 
 
In this regression, an observation is related to industry j in country c. The United 
States is excluded from the sample. The control variables are the legal origins of the 
country (the estimated values of the key three coefficients are unchanged when these 
control variables are removed) and industry dummy variables (not reported). We cluster-
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adjust the standard errors at the country level. There are 623 industry-country 
observations, and the estimation is a panel regression.16  
We naturally expect β1 > 0 and close to unity: the propensity to do same-industry 
mergers in industry j in any country c is positively related to the propensity of doing that 
in the U.S. Importantly, we expect β2 < 0, since stronger creditor rights in the country 
mitigates the propensity to do same-industry mergers. We also expect that β3 < 0, as 
before, although our focus is on the sign of β2.  
 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE. 
 
The results in Panel A of Table 9 strongly support our hypothesis.  The estimation 
in column (1) follows the Rajan-Zingales (1998) specification which includes country 
fixed effects to control for country-specific factors.  We obtain that β1 is significantly 
positive and insignificantly different from 1,17 suggesting that the inherent likelihood of 
acquirers in various countries to do same-industry mergers is similar to the likelihood of 
doing the same by U.S. acquirers in the same industry. Importantly, this inherent 
likelihood of doing same-industry mergers is significantly reduced in countries with 
strong creditor rights: β2 is negative and highly significant. One standard deviation 
increase in the interacted term is associated with 7.2% drop from the mean value of 
PROP.  The same results are obtained in columns (2) and (3), with additional country-
specific variables (but without country fixed effects). The coefficient β3 of CRIGHTS is 
negative and significant in a 10% one-tail test.  
Panel B of Table 9 examines the industry operating risk (related to the analysis in 
Tables 7 and 8), relating it to the industry risk level in the U.S., denoted RISKj,US, and to 
CRIGHTS. RISKj,US is the average of RISK of firms within industry j for each 2-digit SIC 
code industry in the U.S. during the period 1992-1998. Similarly, RISKj,c is the average 
level of RISK of firms in similar industries in other countries, calculated over the 
                                                 
16 We cluster at the country-level by allowing block-diagonal structure in the variance-covariance matrix, where each identity sub-
matrix corresponds to each country in our dataset. Notably, our industry-country panel is unbalanced. 
17 For example, in a test of whether (β1- 1) is different from zero yields a t-statistic of 1.07. 
 24
following period 1999-2005.18  We then perform the following regression: 
 
RISKj,c = δ0 + δ1*RISKj,US + δ2*CRIGHTSc*RISKj,US + δ3*CRIGHTSc + controls.      (13) 
 
As in specification (12), an observation represents industry j in country c, 
excluding the U.S. An industry from the U.S. that is included in the analysis needs to 
have at least three companies with available RISK measures, and a firm should have at 
least five years of data on ROA to calculate its RISK.  Finally, the standard errors are 
cluster-adjust at the country level. There are 802 industry-country observations, and the 
estimation is a (unbalanced) panel regression.  
Again, we naturally expect δ1 > 0 and being close to unity, since higher risk in an 
industry in the U.S. implies that the same industry in another country also has higher risk. 
Indeed, we obtain that δ1 is significantly positive and insignificantly different from 1 
(testing whether δ1 =1 yileds a t statistic of 0.72).  Central to our hypothesis, the estimate 
coefficient δ2 is negative and significant, as expected.   Managers reduce the inherent risk 
of an industry if creditor rights in that country are stronger.  The effect is robust to 
substituting CRIGHTS in (13) with country fixed effects, as verified in column (1) in 
Table 9, Panel B.  
 
3.6. Risk reduction and industry recovery rates 
 
 A final test of the effect of creditor rights on corporate behavior, which is 
different from those done so far, is the examination of the choice of target in a merger or 
acquisition by the recovery rate of its assets in default (henceforth recovery).  In time of 
financial distress, a firm with high-recovery assets can liquidate some assets and use the 
proceeds to avoid default, i.e., to extend the life of the implicit call option that is 
embedded in the firm’s equity.  Bidder firms with low-recovery assets are therefore more 
vulnerable to default risk because they are less able to defer default by asset liquidation.  
Indeed, Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996) find that a high recovery value of assets (imputed 
                                                 
18 The results are qualitatively unchanged when the variables for both the US and all other countries are 
calculated over the entire sample period, 1992-2005. 
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from book value items) have particularly high value for firms in financial distress. Eckbo 
and Thornton (2003) find that the recovery rate of the firm’s debt in default positively 
affects the likelihood of a manager of a bankrupt company to be rehired after being 
automatically terminated in Sweden (following its bankruptcy law). That is, increasing 
the recovery rate of debt in default serves the managerial interest. 
We therefore propose the following hypothesis.   
 
Hypothesis III:  In economies with strong creditor rights, target firms in high-recovery 
industries are more likely to be acquired by firms in low-recovery industry. 
 
An acquirer in low-recovery industry, being more vulnerable to default, seeks high-
recovery assets that can be more easily liquidated in time of financial distress. The 
dependent variable in the test of this hypothesis is Pr(TH∩AL|TH), the probability of 
acquisition by low-recovery acquirer (AL) of a high-recovery target (TH) within the set 
of all TH transactions. By our hypothesis, this probability is positively associated with 
CRIGHTS.   
We assign to firms the recovery level of the industry in which they operate, using 
the data in Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2008, Table 2) which employs historical 
experience on defaults in the U.S. over the period 1982-1999.  Low recovery industries 
(in terms of 2-SIC code headers) are: transportation (37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47), high 
technology and office equipment (35, 36, 38), consumer/ service sector (52, 53, 54, 55, 
56, 57, 58, 59, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79), and leisure time/ media (27, 48, 70).  High 
recovery industries are: energy and natural resources (10, 12, 13, 14, 24), building 
products/ homebuilders (8, 15, 17, 24, 28, 29, 32, 34), and healthcare/ chemicals (28, 
80.)19  In the estimation model, the universe is all targets with high recovery, and the 
bidders are either low-recovery (dependent variable = 1), or high recovery (dependent 
variable = 0).   
 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
                                                 
19 We have alternatively followed Dyck and Zingales (2004) and characterize as low recovery rate industries the following ones: 
mining, manufacturing, and transportation. Our results are similar. 
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 The results in Table 10 support our hypothesis. The coefficient of CRIGHTS is 
positive and significant for the entire sample, and even more so when the U.S., which by 
itself constitutes half the sample, is excluded (column (6)).   All components of creditor 
rights have positive coefficients, and with the exclusion of SECURED they are 
statistically significant. That is, stronger creditor rights induce greater likelihood of a 
target with high-recovery assets to be acquired by a low-recovery firm. The relatively 
large coefficient of MANAGES underscores the evidence in Eckbo and Thornton (2003) 
that in a regime where the manager is laid off in default, the rehiring probability increases 
in the recovery rate of debt, which in turn is enhanced if the firm owns high-recovery 
assets. 
The model is also estimated as a country-level regression, where the dependent 
variable is the proportion of all high-recovery targets in the country acquired by low-
recovery bidders (using Theil’s transformation).  In this regression, each country is 
considered as a single observation, mitigating the effects of large countries. For sake of 
parsimony, we do not present the table. In this estimation, the coefficient of CRIGHTS is 
0.325 with t = 4.49, highly significant.20 
This test provides additional evidence that creditor rights affect the choice of 
investment – here, an acquisition target – particularly by low-recovery acquirers, which 
seek to acquire high-recovery targets.  As we argue throughout, if investment choices are 
constrained by creditor rights, they may be suboptimal from an overall economic 
viewpoint.  
 
                                                 
20 We further conduct a test in the spirit of this hypothesis, examining the proportion among all low-recovery bidders that seek high-
recovery targets.  In this regression, the effect of CRIGHTS is insignificant. 
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4. Conclusions  
 
An interesting possibility that emerges from our results is that strong creditor 
rights may have a “dark” side in terms of their effect on corporate investments and 
attitude towards risk.  Employing several methods, we find that stronger creditor rights in 
a country induce firms to take less risk and prefer diversifying acquisitions.  If these 
actions would not have otherwise been taken by the firms, it follows that creditor rights 
have real effect on corporate decisions whose value effects may be questionable. 
The existing finance and economics literature generally views strong creditor 
rights as a positive feature of the law in that they enable firms to raise greater external 
financing.  Our model and empirical work imply that the same creditor rights may 
destroy firms’ incentives to undertake value-enhancing but risky projects, and may 
induce firms to do value-reducing diversifying acquisitions.  Thus, stronger creditor 
rights are not always optimal. The optimal level of creditor rights may thus have to 
balance the positive effect on debt capacity of firms and the negative effect on their 
investment choices.  In future work, it would be interesting to get directly at this 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Main Variables Definition Source 
Risk-reduction measures   
PROP Theil transformation of the share of same industry mergers, per country. We define it as follows: 

























= is the earnings scaled by 
assets of firm i from country c in year t. Data are annual, and the sample period is 1992-2005. The entire 
data of Ei,c,t is winsorized at 0.5% in both tails to account for extreme observations.  The entire firm sample 






Country risk (RISK* )  
 
 
The average of RISKi,c, across firms in country c.  
 
Creditor- Rights Variables 
Creditor rights (CRIGHTS) An index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta and others (1998).  It is the sum of the four indexes 
that follow. CRIGHTS then ranges between 0 and 4. 
La Porta et al. (1998), 
Djankov, McLeish, 
and Shleifer (2007a) 
 
No automatic stay 
(AUTOSTAY) 
Equals one if the reorganization procedure does not impose an automatic stay on the assets of the firm upon 
filing the reorganization petition, secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization 
petition is approved. It equals zero if such restriction does exist in the law. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
 
Reorganization (REORG) 
Equals one if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum 
dividend for a debtor to be able to file for reorganization. It equals zero for countries without such 
restrictions. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
 
Secured debt first (SECURED) 
Equals one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the 
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm, as opposed to other creditors such as employees or government. 
Equals zero if non-secured creditors, such as the government and workers, are given absolute priority. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
 
No management stay 
(MANAGES) 
Equals one if an official appointed by the court, or by the creditors, is responsible for the operation of the 
business during reorganization, that is management does not retain administration of its property pending 
the resolution of the reorganization. Equivalently, this variable equals one if the debtor does not keep the 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization process, and zero otherwise. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Control Variables   
GDP-per-capita (in U.S. 
dollars) (GDP) 





The standard deviation of the quarterly growth in real industrial production for each country in the period 
1990-2004. For some countries, we use instead the index of manufacturing production: Argentina, Chile, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Singapore and South Africa. For 
Argentina, Canada, Taiwan and Thailand, data are from the international database of Global Insight. The 
variable is measured in decimal points.  
International 
Financial Statistics of 
IMF.  
Rule of Law (LAW) The assessment of the law and order tradition of the country.  Calculated as “average of the months of April 
and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from zero to 10, with lower scores for less 
tradition for law and order.” 
International Country 
Risk Guide; La Porta 
et al. (1998). 
Legal Origins A dummy variable that identifies the legal origin of the Company law or Commercial Code of each country.   
The detailed origins are French, German, Nordic (default is Common) 
La Porta et al. (1998) 




An index that aggregates shareholder rights. “The index is formed by adding one when: (1) the country 
allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their 
shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of 
minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ 
meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights 
that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from zero to six.” 
Quotation is from La 
Porta et al. (1998). 
 Table 2. Overall descriptive statistics 
Table 2 describes the total number of domestic mergers in the sample countries for 1994-2004. The sample presented consists of the countries for which 
we have La Porta et al. (1998) data on creditor rights. We exclude countries that have less than 50 qualified transactions in the sample period. A 
transaction is qualified if the percentage of acquired shares is at least 20%. We exclude financial industry (SIC header 6) and regulated industry 
companies (SIC headers 48 and 49) from the country transaction count. The mergers and acquisition data is from SDC Platinum Mergers and 
Acquisitions database. The year of creditor rights change is the one from the Djankov et al. (2007a) study. We also present data on the average country 




Year of creditor 
rights change # Mergers  





Rights Creditor Rights 
Macroeconomic 
Volatility 




CHANGE COUNT SAME RISK SHRIGHTS CRIGHTS MacroRisk GDP 
Argentina - 150 55.33% 0.058 4 1 0.07 $7,801 
Australia - 2,939 61.72% 0.121 4 1 0.04 $20,948 
Austria - 217 64.52% 0.036 2 3 0.09 $26,220 
Belgium - 325 57.54% 0.043 0 2 0.08 $24,649 
Brazil - 343 70.26% 0.070 3 1 0.03 $4,143 
Canada - 3,798 61.37% 0.094 5 1 0.01 $20,647 
Chile - 76 61.84% 0.033 5 2 0.04 $4,604 
Denmark - 402 56.47% 0.049 2 3 0.07 $32,434 
Finland - 881 54.60% 0.054 3 1 0.08 $23,856 
France - 2,666 59.79% 0.045 3 0 0.1 $24,033 
Germany - 3,524 55.31% 0.057 1 3 0.04 $26,443 
Greece - 324 47.22% 0.043 2 1 0.06 $11,219 
Hong Kong - 343 34.11% 0.064 5 4 0.13 $23,850 
India - 470 57.87% 0.051 5 4 0.07 $423 
Indonesia 1998 76 60.53% . 2 4 0.07 $868 
Ireland - 206 63.59% . 4 1 0.08 $21,376 
Israel 1996 110 45.45% 0.075 3 4 0.02 $16,391 
Italy - 876 53.31% 0.038 1 2 0.12 $19,814 
Japan 2000 3,301 46.80% 0.022 4 2 0.03 $36,616 
Malaysia - 1,207 25.27% 0.066 4 4 0.05 $3,982 
Mexico - 147 62.59% 0.049 1 0 0.03 $4,421 
Netherlands - 846 57.80% 0.059 2 2 0.11 $24,802 
New Zealand - 343 57.73% 0.073 4 3 0.06 $15,528 
Norway - 341 58.94% 0.079 4 2 0.07 $33,844 
Peru - 51 68.63% 0.058 3 0 0.07 $2,296 
Philippines - 75 56.00% 0.080 3 0 0.18 $1,041 
Portugal - 147 65.31% 0.036 3 1 0.06 $10,782 
Singapore - 407 32.19% 0.064 4 4 0.06 $22,916 
South Africa - 612 49.84% 0.061 5 3 0.02 $3,413 
South Korea - 314 32.48% 0.051 2 3 0.06 $9,545 
Spain - 1,122 64.08% 0.040 4 2 0.08 $14,535 
Sweden 1996 680 58.53% 0.067 3 2 0.16 $26,812 
Switzerland - 463 57.67% 0.046 2 1 0.07 $37,908 
Taiwan - 98 44.90% 0.039 3 2 0.06 $12,580 
Thailand 1999 157 43.95% 0.065 2 3 0.05 $2,396 




9,446 58.61% 0.071 5 4 0.05 $21,767 
United States - 40,656 59.07% 0.088 5 1 0.01 $30,899 
 Table 3.  Merger-level analysis: proportion of same-industry mergers 
Regressions of the incidence of same-industry mergers on creditor rights, components of creditor rights and controls.  The dependent variable equals 1 if both acquirer and target are in the same 
industry, using 2-digit SIC code. A transaction is included if the percentage of acquired shares is at least 20%. Excluded are transactions where the acquirer is from the financial industry (SIC header 
6) or regulated industry (SIC headers 48 and 49).  CRIGHTS are as of 1994. The control variables include shareholder rights, rule of law, macroeconomic risk, legal origins, the logarithm of average 
real GDP-per-capita (1994-2000) in US$, the logarithm of transaction value, and the ranked median leverage for the industry of the acquirer and for the industry of the target.  All variables are defined 
in Table 1. The OLS regression include year fixed effects (not reported). Models (1) through (5) include all countries. Model (7) excludes the United States. Models (7) and (8) present estimation 
based on random probit model; (7) includes all countries and (8) excludes the United States. t-statistics are in parentheses. The OLS t-statistics are based on robust standard errors that are cluster-
adjusted at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Sample period is 1994-2004. 
 OLS Probit 
 All countries Excluding U.S. All countries Excluding U.S. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CRIGHTS -0.015**     -0.017** -0.056*** -0.061*** 
 (2.21)     (2.16) (3.8) (3.63) 
AUTOSTAY  -0.042**         
  (2.45)         
REORG   -0.021        
   (1.13)        
SECURED    0.001       
    (0.02)       
MANAGES     -0.057***      
     (3.07)      
SHRIGHTS 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.018* 0.012 0.027 0.030 
 (0.92) (0.64) (0.49) (0.35) (1.74) (1.01) (1.49) (1.53) 
Rule of Law 0.121*** 0.131*** 0.114*** 0.111*** 0.113*** 0.094*** 0.241*** 0.215*** 
 (4.43) (4.57) (3.69) (3.33) (4.35) (3.15) (3.98) (3.27) 
French Legal Origin 0.142*** 0.155*** 0.162*** 0.174*** 0.139*** 0.13*** 0.331*** 0.334*** 
 (3.56) (3.84) (3.71) (4.55) (3.47) (3.81) (4.51) (4.18) 
German Legal Origin -0.051** -0.06*** -0.068*** -0.066*** -0.016 -0.073*** -0.105* -0.094 
 (2.41) (2.96) (3.38) (3.09) (0.55) (3.04) (1.78) (1.39) 
Nordic Legal Origin 0.030 0.025 0.057 0.066 0.016 0.031 0.082 0.087 
  (0.53) (0.45) (0.93) (1.09) (0.32) (0.57) (1.05) (1.06) 
MacroRisk -1.027*** -1.127*** -1.345*** -1.612*** -0.857*** -1.062*** -2.449*** -2.357*** 
 (2.72) (3.31) (3.38) (5.25) (2.78) (2.77) (3.75) (3.41) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.069*** -0.072*** -0.061*** -0.055*** -0.069*** -0.05*** -0.155*** -0.143*** 
  (4.5) (4.73) (3.57) (3.13) (4.57) (3.21) (4.02) (3.3) 
Log( Transaction Value) 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.005 0.022*** 0.01** 
 (2.69) (2.75) (2.82) (2.9) (2.47) (1.16) (6.45) (2.01) 
Ranked median leverage 
for acquirer’s industry  0.016* 0.016* 0.015* 0.015* 0.016* -0.001 0.033*** -0.006 
 (1.83) (1.81) (1.76) (1.72) (1.88) (0.11) (4.4) (0.56) 
Ranked median leverage 
for target’s industry  -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.034*** -0.107*** -0.086*** 
 (5.96) (5.99) (6.04) (6.08) (5.86) (3.65) (14.02) (8.01) 
 Sample period 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Number of countries 38 38 38 38 38 37 38 37 
Observations 33,221 33,221 33,221 33,221 33,221 15,730 33,221 15,730 
R-squared 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 2.4% - - 
Chi-squared - - - - - - 370.1 189.1 
 
 Table 4. Country-level analysis: proportion of same-industry mergers 
The dependent variable is the fraction of same-industry mergers (2-digit SIC code) out of all mergers in the country, employing Theil’s transformation 
of the fraction. A country is included in our sample if it has at least 50 qualified transactions over the sample period. A qualified transaction is where at 
least 20% of the target is acquired.  Excluded are acquirers from the financial industry (SIC header 6) and regulated industry companies (SIC headers 
48 and 49). The sample period is 1994-2004. All variables are defined in Table 1. Model (6) uses a value-weighted average of the country creditor 
rights time series (from Djankov et al. (2007a)), where the weights are the number of M&A transactions within a given country in the subsequent year. 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CRIGHTS -0.141**          
 (2.43)          
Average CRIGHTS      -0.127** 
      (2.16) 
AUTOSTAY   -0.226        
   (1.55)        
REORG     -0.087      
     (0.67)      
SECURED       -0.236*    
       (1.89)    
MANAGES         -0.539***  
         (3.37)  
SHRIGHTS 0.034 0.027 0.057 0.062* 0.043 0.044 
 (0.91) (0.57) (1.51) (1.84) (1.35) (1.21) 
Rule of Law 0.167* 0.173* 0.168* 0.182** 0.079 0.176** 
 (1.91) (1.89) (1.83) (2.06) (0.95) (2.09) 
French Legal Origin 0.325* 0.44** 0.579*** 0.542*** 0.226 0.406** 
 (1.92) (2.23) (3.02) (3.02) (1.51) (2.22) 
German Legal Origin 0.053 0.112 0.123 0.166 -0.034 0.071 
 (0.23) (0.47) (0.48) (0.68) (0.18) (0.30) 
Nordic Legal Origin 0.243 0.252 0.384* 0.38* 0.090 0.209 
  (1.38) (1.28) (1.77) (1.83) (0.59) (1.05) 
MacroRisk -1.856 -1.871 -2.149 -2.260 -2.272** -1.703 
 (1.45) (1.3) (1.3) (1.43) (2.13) (1.25) 
Log GDP per capita -0.165 -0.155 -0.137 -0.136 -0.116 -0.133 
 (1.43) (1.37) (1.23) (1.16) (1.11) (1.25) 
Sample period 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 
Observations 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 42.9% 35.9% 32.2% 34.7% 51.0% 38.5% 
 Table 5. Country-level analysis across two sub-periods: proportion of same-industry mergers 
The dependent variable is the proportion of same-industry mergers (2-digit SIC code) out of all mergers in the country, employing Theil’s 
transformation. This table is identical to Table 4, except that the proportion of same-industry mergers is calculated separately for each of the two 
subperiod, 1994-1999 and 2000-2004. A country in included in the sample if it has at least 30 qualified transactions for each sub-period.  The rest is as 
in Table 4. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CRIGHTS -0.138***         
 (3.20)         
AUTOSTAY   -0.253**       
   (2.25)       
REORG     -0.067     
     (0.66)     
SECURED       -0.198   
       (1.40)   
MANAGES         -0.55*** 
         (4.63) 
SHRIGHTS 0.022 0.008 0.043 0.048 0.028 
 (0.51) (0.18) (0.95) (1.06) (0.71) 
Rule of Law 0.161** 0.175** 0.168** 0.178** 0.068 
 (2.47) (2.59) (2.4) (2.55) (1.06) 
French Legal Origin 0.305* 0.392** 0.553*** 0.522*** 0.198 
 (1.94) (2.47) (3.81) (3.6) (1.34) 
German Legal Origin 0.048 0.099 0.119 0.155 -0.044 
 (0.3) (0.6) (0.69) (0.91) (0.29) 
Nordic Legal Origin 0.247 0.234 0.376* 0.376* 0.091 
 (1.34) (1.19) (1.93) (1.96) (0.51) 
Macro Risk -1.996 -1.951 -2.284 -2.373 -2.433* 
 (1.45) (1.36) (1.54) (1.63) (1.9) 
Log GDP per capita -0.181** -0.181** -0.156* -0.153* -0.133* 












Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 
R-squared 37.3% 32.7% 27.8% 29.5% 45.6% 
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Table 6. Causality Regressions, merger-level analysis of changes in bankruptcy law 
The dependent variable equals 1 for same-industry acquisition (using 2-digit SIC code).  The creditor rights change dummy, ΔCRIGHTS, represents a dummy variable with value zero for the 
control sample (no change in creditor rights) and for the treatment sample (countries in which there was change in CRIGHTS) prior to an increase in creditor rights strength or after a decrease in the 
creditor rights strength if the change reduced the strength of CRIGHTS. This dummy variable equals one following an increase in the creditor rights strength, and preceding a decrease in the creditor 
rights strength.  Included are all merger and acquisitions where the acquired percentage shares is at least 20%, the transaction has a disclosed value, and the time changes in creditor rights are 
available in Djankov et al. (2007a). In part I, model 1 utilizes linear probability model (OLS), while model 2 is based on random probit regressions. For the latter we report the marginal effects. 
Excluded are transactions where the acquirer is in the financial industry (SIC header 6) or regulated industry (SIC headers 48 and 49).  The sample period is 1994-2004. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. In model (1), Part I, standard errors are cluster-adjusted at the country level. Included (but not reported for brevity) are fixed effects for country, year and 2-digit SIC code fixed effects 
for the acquirer’s industry, and legal origins following the difference-in-differences methodology of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). In model (2) we include random effects at the 
country, year, and 2-digit industry code level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Part I. Mutivariate Analysis 
 (1) (2) 
 Linear probability models Probit models 
 Pr(SAME) Pr(SAME) 
ΔCRIGHTS c,t -0.069*** -0.240*** 
 (3.19) (2.48) 
Log (Transaction 
Value) 0.01* 0.034*** 
 (1.88) (8.57) 
Fixed Effects Yes: country, year, and industry No 
Random Effects No Yes: country, year, and industry 
Observations 29,567 29,548 
 
 Part II. Details of Creditor Rights Changes 
 Year of law change Detail of change 
Indonesia 1998 Change to SECURED = 0 
Israel 1996 Introduction of automatic stay, i.e. AUTOSTAY = 0 
Japan 2000 Change to SECURED = 0 
Russia 1998 and 2002 
1998: Change to MANAGES = 0. 
2002: Re-instating MANAGES = 1. 
Sweden 1996 Change to REORG = 0. 
Thailand 1999 Change to REORG = 0. 
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Table 7. Operating risk and creditor rights: RISK at firm level 
The dependent variable, RISK, is the standard deviation of the firm profitability defined as EBITDA/ASSETS (see definition in Table 1).  The sample period is 1992-2005. Included are companies 
from the manufacturing industry only (SIC 2000 – 3999).  The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors cluster-adjusted at the country level.  We also include one-digit SIC 
code industry effects (not reported).  The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors cluster-adjusted at the country level.  The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 All countries Exclude U.S. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CRIGHTS -0.007***     -0.008** 
 (3.33)     (2.62) 
AUTOSTAY  -0.016**     
  (2.61)     
REORG   -0.003    
   (0.47)    
SECURED    -0.010   
    (0.97)   
MANAGES     -0.028***  
     (7.17)  
SHRIGHTS -0.004 -0.006* -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 
 (1.5) (1.95) (1.11) (1.23) (0.51) (1.59) 
Rule of Law -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.011** -0.002 
 (0.37) (0.01) (0.76) (1.04) (2.20) (0.2) 
French Legal Origin -0.031** -0.028** -0.013 -0.017* -0.03*** -0.038*** 
 (2.33) (2.31) (1.05) (1.7) (3.31) (2.87) 
German Legal Origin -0.036*** -0.04*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.044*** 
 (3.94) (3.94) (3.5) (3.76) (4.36) (4.64) 
Nordic Legal Origin -0.019 -0.023* -0.011 -0.012 -0.021** -0.024* 
 (1.58) (1.88) (0.89) (0.98) (1.99) (1.94) 
MacroRisk -0.038 -0.069 -0.122 -0.142 -0.027 0.015 
 (0.44) (0.81) (1.09) (1.54) (0.40) (0.20) 
Log GDP per capita -0.035 -0.059 -0.118 -0.131 -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.38) (0.66) (1.03) (1.46) (0.38) (0.3) 
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Ranked industry median leverage -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.003*** 
 (3.62) (3.78) (3.96) (3.95) (3.42) (3.54) 
Log of initial total assets -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.01*** 
 (5.25) (5.33) (5.27) (5.25) (5.13) (5.51) 
Observations 5,394 5,394 5,394 5,394 5,394 3,812 
R-squared 29.3% 29.1% 28.5% 28.6% 30.2% 23.2% 




Table 8. Country-level operating risk, RISK*, and creditor rights:  
 
RISK* is the average for each country of the variable RISK of the firms in the country, where RISK is the standard deviation of the firm profitability. Included are companies from the manufacturing 
industry only (SIC 2000 – 3999). All variables are defined in Table 1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors. The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CRIGHTS -0.008**         
 (2.47)         
AUTOSTAY   -0.018**       
   (2.32)       
REORG     -0.0030     
     (0.38)     
SECURED       -0.0050   
       (0.58)   
MANAGES         -0.031*** 
         (3.72) 
SHRIGHTS -0.0020 -0.0030 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 (0.87) (1.22) (0.37) (0.33) (0.67) 
Rule of Law -0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0010 0.0000 -0.007** 
 (0.6) (0.33) (0.2) (0.12) (2.14) 
MacroRisk 0.0460 0.0480 0.0100 0.0050 0.0310 
 (0.66) (0.56) (0.1) (0.05) (0.44) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 
 (0.2) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.94) 
French Legal Origin -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.024** -0.024*** -0.048*** 
 (3.44) (3.51) (2.32) (2.72) (4.66) 
German Legal Origin -0.041*** -0.04*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.045*** 
 (3.91) (3.33) (3.07) (3.23) (4.92) 
Nordic Legal Origin -0.023* -0.025** -0.0130 -0.0130 -0.033*** 
 (1.86) (1.97) (1.11) (1.12) (2.64) 
Observations 35 35 35 35 35 
R-squared 47.0% 45.1% 34.0% 34.3% 56.2% 
 44
Table 9.  Industry-level regressions (Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology) 
Panel A: Industry level of same-industry mergers 
The dependent variable is PROPj,c, the proportion of same-industry mergers in industry j (the acquirer’s) in country c (2-digit SIC).  PROPj,US is the share of same-industry mergers in industry j in 
the U.S., which proxies for the inherent propensity for same-industry mergers. PROPj,US is calculated for the period 1994-1997, and the cross-section regression of PROPj,c is estimated for all other 
countries for the period 1998-2004.  An industry is included if it has at least six qualified transactions during 1998-2004 (for PROPj,US, at least 6 qualified transactions in 1994-1997). A transaction 
is qualified if the percentage of acquired shares is at least 20%. Excluded are transactions in which the acquirer is in the financial industry (SIC header 6) or regulated industry (SIC headers 48 and 
49). A country is included if it has at least two industries that satisfy the above criteria. All variables are defined in Table 1. The t-statistics (in parentheses below the coefficients) are based on 
robust standard errors cluster-adjusted at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1)       (2) (3) 
PROPj,US 1.158*** 1.175*** 1.173*** 
 (7.82) (7.75) (7.72) 
CRIGHTS * PROPj,US -0.199*** -0.21*** -0.209*** 
 (4.56) (4.45) (4.43) 
CRIGHTS   -0.280 -0.267 
   (1.63) (1.64) 
French Legal Origin    0.047 
    (0.19) 
German Legal Origin    -0.312 
    (0.62) 
Nordic Legal Origin    0.023 
    (0.05) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes No No 
Observations 623 623 623 
R-squared 27.1% 13.4% 13.6% 
 
Panel B: Industry average risk 
The dependent variable is RISKj,c, the average of RISKi,j,c, the standard deviation of EBITDA/ASSETS of firm i in industry j in country c. RISKj,US is the same measure for the U.S., serving as a proxy 
for the inherent industry risk. RISKj,US is computed over 1992-1998, where an included firm should have at least five annual observations. RISKj,c Is calculated over the period 1999-2005. The unit 
of observation is 2-digit SIC code industry.  Excluded industries are as in Panel A.  An included industry needs to have at least two firms with available RISK. 
 
RISKj,US 0.862*** 0.953*** 0.921*** 
 (4.49) (4.63) (4.77) 
CRIGHTS * RISKj,US -0.158** -0.177** -0.173** 
 (2.16) (2.38) (2.38) 
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CRIGHTS   0.012*** 0.008* 
   (3.01) (1.92) 
French Legal Origin    -0.023** 
    (2.57) 
German Legal Origin    -0.026*** 
    (2.77) 
Nordic Legal Origin    0.000 
    (0.03) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes No No 
Observations 802 802 802 






Table 10. Recovery rates and mergers and acquisitions  
The table uses OLS linear probability models. The dependent variable equals 1 if Prob(TH∩ AL|TH) = 1, i.e., if the target is in a high-recovery industry and the acquirer is in a low-recovery 
industry. The universe is all target firms in high recovery industry. Included are all transactions where the percentage of acquired shares is at least 20%. Excluded are transactions involving 
acquirers financial industry (SIC header 6) and regulated industry companies (SIC headers 48 and 49). The following industries are classified as low recovery (2-SIC code headers): transportation 
(37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47), high technology and office equipment (35, 36, 38), consumer/ service sector (52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79), or leisure time/ media (27, 48, 
70). The following industries are classified as high recovery (2-SIC code headers): energy and natural resources (10, 12, 13, 14, 24), building products/ homebuilders (8, 15, 17, 24, 28, 29, 32, 34), 
or healthcare/ chemicals (28, 80). This classification follows Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2006).  All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample period is 1994-2004. The absolute values of 
the t-statistics are shown in parentheses below the coefficients and are based on robust standard errors that are cluster-adjusted at the country level. We include a year fixed effect (not reported). ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, correspondingly. The table further reports the number of observations and R-squared. 
 
 Dependent variable = 1 for (TH∩ AL|TH)  
 All countries Excluding the U.S. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
CRIGHTS 0.021***     0.032***     
 (3.05)     (6.64)     
AUTOSTAY  0.064***     0.074***    
  (3.87)     (6.1)    
REORG   0.052***     0.08***   
   (3.01)     (6.27)   
SECURED    0.036     0.029  
    (1.47)     (1.01)  
MANAGES     0.042*     0.093*** 
     (1.85)     (4.72) 
SHRIGHTS 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.022 0.012 0.000 0.009 0.005 0.016 -0.009 
 (1.10) (1.63) (1.49) (1.56) (0.82) (0.01) (1.05) (0.49) (1.24) (0.77) 
Rule of Law -0.179*** -0.192*** -0.177*** -0.186*** -0.172*** -0.06** -0.101*** -0.058* -0.101*** -0.023 
 (3.81) (4.43) (3.69) (3.71) (3.39) (2.33) (3.54) (1.89) (3.23) (0.69) 
French Legal Origin -0.131*** -0.144*** -0.153*** -0.163*** -0.148*** -0.046* -0.09*** -0.078*** -0.123*** -0.041 
 (2.82) (3.15) (3.19) (2.89) (2.78) (1.71) (2.66) (2.85) (2.96) (1.11) 
German Legal Origin -0.002 0.010 0.019 0.017 -0.017 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.102*** 0.076*** 0.036 
 (0.07) (0.35) (0.63) (0.51) (0.42) (2.97) (2.7) (4.1) (3.09) (1.42) 
Nordic Legal Origin 0.154 0.17* 0.122 0.114 0.148 0.174* 0.178* 0.127 0.114 0.19** 
  (1.63) (1.81) (1.2) (1.02) (1.5) (1.91) (1.89) (1.28) (1) (2.1) 
MacroRisk 1.35*** 1.379*** 1.542*** 2.191*** 1.61*** 1.25*** 1.5*** 1.502*** 2.353*** 1.252*** 
 (3.18) (3.35) (3.62) (4.03) (3.19) (3.64) (3.96) (4.52) (4.09) (2.84) 
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  (4.22) (4.52) (4.17) (4.11) (3.89) (4.03) (4.31) (3.7) (3.75) (2.42) 
Log (Transaction Value) -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* 
 (2.18) (2.27) (2.26) (2.25) (2.06) (1.88) (1.81) (1.94) (1.79) (1.82) 
Ranked Medial Leverage -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.116*** -0.118*** 
For Acquirer Industry (7.14) (7.16) (7.11) (7.13) (7.11) (3.68) (3.67) (3.66) (3.64) (3.67) 
Ranked Medial Leverage 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.103*** 0.097*** 
For Target Industry (10.54) (10.77) (10.71) (10.89) (10.76) (5.2) (5.4) (5.26) (5.31) (5.19) 
Sample period 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 1994-2004 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 38 38 38 38 38 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations 6,495 6,495 6,495 6,495 6,495 3,356 3,356 3,356 3,356 3,356 
R-squared 12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 12.1% 12.2% 17.1% 16.8% 17.0% 16.0% 17.0% 
 
  




the riskiness of the 
leveraged firm, y.
The firm has debt of 
face value F 
payable next period. 
The firm’s cashflow
is realised to be high 
or low. 
There is default on 
firm’s debt in low 
state.
With probability r, 
creditors of the firm fail 
to reach any agreement 
to reorganize and firm 
is liquidated. 
Management suffers a 
private cost of m. 
Otherwise, managerial 
type is investigated.
With probability q, 
managerial type is 
revealed during 
investigation.
If type is low (probability 
0.5), the firm is efficiently 
liquidated and 
management suffers a 
private cost of m. 
























remains uncertain and 
firm is continued.
If type turns out to be 
high, the output is H. 
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Figure 2. Theil transformation of the share of same industry mergers, PROP, and creditor rights, CRIGHTS. 
The fitted line represents the slope from an OLS regression of the Theil transformation of the share of same industry mergers on a
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